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Summary: The paper deals with architecture of language. A language is considered as 
a system of meaning. Semiotic means of language are studied. Physical, biological and social 
systems are analyzed. The conclusion is made that the organization of language is determined by 
the movement of meaning. 
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Аннотация: В научной статье рассматривается структура языка. Язык 
рассматривается как система значений. Изучаются семиотические средства языка. 
Анализируются физическая, биологическая и социальная системы языка. Делается вывод 
о том, что организация языка определяется динамикой значения.  
Ключевые слова: биологическая система, семиотическая система, структура 
языка, социальная система, физическая система. 
Анотація: У науковій статті розглядається структура мови. Мова розглядається як 
система значень. Вивчаються семіотичні засоби мови. Аналізуються фізична, біологічна та 
соціальна системи. Робиться висновок про те, що організація мови визначається 
динамікою значення. 
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The paper concerns architecture of language. In some cases it will be clear how 
these assumptions were arrived at.  
But not all the basic concepts will be made explicit in this way: partly 
because we never fully grounded them — and partly because, even when we 
wanted to do so, we used to think that an academic article should be like a finished 
garment, with all the tacking removed before it was put on display. That was a 
mistake. In any case, simply by being resented in the context of a published text 
the organizing concepts are bound to appear as ready-made, as if they had been in 
place from the start. But they weren't; rather, they emerged as the by-product of 
those engagements as we struggled with particular problems – problems that arose 
in my own work, in literary analysis or language teaching or translation, human 
and mechanical; but also, increasingly, problems that were faced by people in 
difference disciplines and professions. The "assumptions" were more like working 
hypotheses that enabled me to formulate, and to begin to explore, a broad variety 
of questions concerning language [1, c. 70]. 
A language is a system of meaning – a semiotic system. "Semiotic" means 
having to do with meaning (semiosis), so a system of meaning is one by which 
meaning is created and meanings are exchanged. Human beings use numerous 
semiotic systems, some simple and others very complex, some rather clearly 
defined and others notably fuzzy. A language is almost certainly the most 
complicated semiotic system we have; it is also a very fuzzy one, both in the sense 
that its own limits are unclear and in the sense that its internal organization is full 
of indeterminacy [1, с. 112]. 
There are three other kinds of system: physical, biological and social. One 
way to think of these is as forming an ascending order of complexity. A physical 
system is just that: a physical system. A biological system, on the other hand, is not 
just that; it is a physical system (or an assembly of physical systems) having an 
additional feature, let us say "life". A social system, in turn, is an assembly of 
biological systems (life forms) having a further additional feature — which we 
might call "value": it is what defines membership; so, an assembly of life forms 
with a membership hierarchy. So a social system is a system of a third order of 
complexity, because it is social and biological and physical. We could then think of 
a semiotic system as being of a fourth order of complexity, being semiotic and 
social and biological and physical: meaning is socially constructed, biologically 
activated and exchanged through physical channels.  
But this picture has to be reconciled with another: that of the two orders of 
phenomena which make up the world which we inhabit. Here "semiotic" contrasts 
with "material": phenomena of matter, and phenomena of meaning. George 
Williams puts it like this:  
Evolutionary biologists ... work with two more or less incommensurable 
domains: that of information and that of matter ... These two domains will never be 
brought together in any kind of the sense usually implied by the term 
"reductionism". You can speak of galaxies and particles of dust in the same terms, 
because they both have mass and charge and length and width. You can't do that 
with information and matter. Information doesn't have mass or charge or length in 
millimeters. Likewise, matter doesn't have bytes. You can't measure so much gold 
in so many bytes. It doesn't have redundancy, or fidelity, or any of the other 
descriptors we apply to information. This dearth of shared descriptors makes 
matter and information two separate domains of existence, which have to be 
discussed separately, in their own terms [5, p. 43]. 
But "information" a special kind of meaning – the kind that can be 
measured. [5, p. 51] Most higher-order meaning cannot be measured, or at least 
cannot be quantified; it can sometimes be graded in terms of value. So we will 
prefer the opposition of "matter" and "meaning", the realm of the material and the 
realm of the semiotic.  
The four types of system then appear as different mixes of the semiotic and 
the material, ranging from physical systems, which are organizations of material 
phenomena, to semiotic systems, which are organizations of meaning. (We are 
using "semiotic" in both these taxonomic contexts, but not with any danger of 
ambiguity). Biological systems are largely material – except that they are 
organized by genes, and at a certain point in evolution by neurons, which are 
semiotic phenomena; and with social systems the meaning component comes to 
predominate. But even semiotic systems are grounded in material processes; and 
on the other hand in post-Newtonian physics quantum systems are interpreted as 
systems of meaning. Meaning needs matter to realize it; at the same time, matter 
needs meaning to organize it. 
Human history is a continuing interplay of the material and the semiotic, as 
modes of action — ways of doing and of being. The balance between the two is 
constantly shifting (presumably the "information society" is one in which the 
semiotic mode of exchange predominates over the material). This is the context in 
which language needs to be understood. 
Of all human semiotic systems, language is the greatest source of power. 
Its potential is indefinitely large. People might characterize it as matching in scope 
all our material systems – always able to keep up with the changes in the material 
conditions of our existence. But putting it like that over privileges the material: it 
spells a technology driven view of the human condition. Language is not a passive 
reflex and all human processes however they are manifested, whether in our 
consciousness, our material frames, or in the physical world around us, are the 
outcome of forces which are both material and semiotic at the same time. Semiotic 
energy is a necessary concomitant, or complement, of material energy in bringing 
about changes in the world. 
Whether or not language matches the scope of all other human semiotic 
systems must be left open to question. Some people claim that it does; they would 
say that anything that can be meant in any way at all can also be meant in 
language. In this view, the scope of semantics (the meaning potential of language) 
is equivalent to the whole of human semi sis. Some semiotic systems may be 
incommensurable with language; witness the sometimes far-fetched attempts to 
represent the meaning of a work of art in language [2, с. 147]. But while the 
question is important, and deserves to be tackled much more subtly and 
fundamentally than this rather simplistic formulation suggests, it is not necessary 
for me to try and resolve it here. All that needs to be said in the present context is 
that other human semiotics are dependent on the premise that their users also have 
language. Language is a prerequisite; but there is no need to insist that language 
can mean it all. The crucial question is: how does language achieve what it does? 
What must language be like such that we are able to do with it all the things that 
we do? [3, p. 105] 
The simplest account of a semiotic system is as a set of signs. When we 
represent it like that we can see that it is not complete: we do not know how we get 
into the system. There must be a condition of entry: let us say "control point". At 
control point, the system is entered: one or the other option must be chosen. Other 
than at control point, the system cannot be entered. Note that 'control point' is itself 
a semiotic feature, though no doubt realized materially. 
Some semiotic systems are minimal. A language, obviously, is not; it is 
vastly more complicated. The question is: how? In what ways is a language more 
complex than a minimal system of signs? We need to spell out the kinds of 
additional complexity which could transform a simple sign system into a language. 
The system is "thickened" along a number of different dimensions. If we posed the 
question in these terms, with the thought that language could be built up by 
expansion from a simple system of signs, we might recognize four dimensions 
along which such expansion would be taking place: signs may be combined, to 
form larger signs (syntagmatic complexity); signs may be uncoupled, to create new 
pairings (realizational complexity); signs may be layered, one cycling into another 
(stratificational complexity); signs may be networked, in relations of dependence 
(paradigmatic complexity). 
Signs may be combined. We do not usually make just one meaning and 
stop there, like a traffic light. Meanings follow quickly one after another, each 
setting up a new context for the next. In this way, larger meanings are built up out 
of combinations of smaller ones: minimal signs — words, or even parts of words. 
These are all "signs", in the sense that they are units, or unities, of meaning. 
Signs may be uncoupled. We are not bound by a fixed one-to-one mapping 
between a content and an expression. A given content may come to be realized by a 
different expression, or a given expression may realize a new content; and in this 
way new signs are being created, since variation of this kind tends to open up new   
meanings – new pairings are unlikely to take on if they are not in some way 
expanding the total resource. Then, putting this feature together with the last means 
that the domain of the content is not limited by the form of the expression: thus, in 
English, the content 'POLARITY: positive/negative is typically realized as a small 
fragment attached to a word. Signs may be layered. We are not restricted to a 
single semiotic cycle. The expression of one content comes to be, at the same time, 
the content of another expression [4, p. 17]. 
Signs may be networked. We do not construct meaning out of sign systems 
that are unrelated to each other. Systems are organized together in the form of 
networks, in such a way that some are dependent on others for their condition of 
entry. Some sets of options, on the other hand, may share the same entry condition 
but be independent of each other. It is this organization in system networks that 
makes it possible for a language to expand its meaning potential more or less 
indefinitely. When we observe the way very small children develop their powers of 
meaning, we can see all these different kinds of complexity emerging. Children's 
first language-like semiotic system, which we labeled "protolanguage" when we 
observed and described it thirty years ago, begins as a collection of simple signs. 
These signs soon come to be organized into minimal systems. But they are not yet 
combined, nor are they yet layered or uncoupled. All these types of complexity, 
including the network, develop together as the necessary condition for the move 
from protolanguage to mother tongue. Not that they have somehow to be put in 
place in advance, as this formulation might imply; rather, they are essential 
features of our evolved human semiotic, and children take them up as they come to 
construe language in its new, post-infancy form. 
Thus, it is through this "thickening" of its meaning-making resources that 
human language has evolved. What has been called the "architecture" of language 
is the organization of these resources within a space defined by a small number of 
interrelated vectors, those of stratification, met a function, and the two 
compositional axes (syntagmatic and paradigmatic); all, in turn, predicated on the 
vector of instantiation (the relation between an instance and the system that lies 
behind it) which is based on memory and is a feature of all systematic behave our. 
In some ways "architecture" is a misleading metaphor, because it is too static; if we 
want a spatial metaphor of this kind we might perhaps think more in terms of town 
planning, with its conception of a spatial layout defined by the movement of 
people, or "traffic flow". The organization of language is likewise defined by the 
movement of meanings. 
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